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In an illuminating 2002 article in the Modern Law Review, Hillary 
Charlesworth spoke of how “international lawyers revel in a good crisis.”2 As 
she elaborated, “A crisis provides a focus for the development of the discipline 
and it also allows international lawyers the sense that their work is of immediate, 
intense relevance.”3 A cursory examination of how the origins, rationale and 
evolution of different branches of public international law are described in 
dominant histories of the field will take us on a narrative path that lurches from 
crisis to crisis. The holocaust offers an especially illuminating example of how 
a particular historical conjuncture is invoked to describe a crisis in the 
international system, and where international law is presented as developing a 
salutary response, in this case the human rights framework, that underscore’s 
international law’s relevance and adequacy to the crisis. In Charlesworth’s 
article, she uses the Kosovo crisis as the ‘crisis-space’4 through which to 
understand how international law mobilizes crisis to assert and delimit the 
questions pertinent to a historical moment, and, concomitantly, offer answers 
that advance and empower the discipline and profession of international law. 
Charlesworth makes a compelling argument that the crisis approach to the 
discipline truncates international law’s imagination of how it operates in the 
world, narrows the socio-historical issues it takes into account and neglects 
structural dimensions of a historical moment. We jump from incident to incident 
in international relations without analyzing the threads that tie them together, 
and shape both the enabling conditions and enduring consequences of ‘crisis’. 
For instance, she describes how the gender dynamics of international relations 
get neglected as we focus on the headlines rather than probing the biases, 
 
 
1  The words “mad and melancholy record” are taken from Robert Jackson’s description of the history 
that the Nuremberg trials told but it could equally be, I argue, the story told about international law 
itself. One Hundred and Eighty-Seventh Day, NUREMBURG TRIAL PROCEEDINGS, July 26,1946, 
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/07-26-46.asp. 
2  Hilary Charlesworth, International Law: A Discipline of Crisis, 65 THE MOD. L. REV.  377, 377 (2002). 
3  Id. 
4  The term ‘crisis-space’ is indebted to David Scott’s conceptualization of the term “problem space” as 
a way to speak of the production of a problem in ways that prefigure the answers. See Stuart Hall, 
David Scott, BOMB (1 June 2005), https://bombmagazine.org/articles/david-scott/. Crisis space speaks 
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hierarchies, and exclusions that are baked into those headline international 
incidents. 5 
In this article, I build on Charlesworth’s insight in examining histories of 
international legal development that link international law to international 
relations, and in particular to crisis in the international system. What is striking 
about the work of crisis invocation in international law is that it is itself a 
response to how international law labors under a sense of its own legitimacy 
crisis—is it real law? Is it adequate to the problems and challenges that disrupt 
and threaten world order? These questions have long haunted the discipline, and 
again and again it has responded with theorizations and histories of its own role 
in international affairs that have doubled down on the crisis of international law 
by externalized it, and harnessing crisis talk in the production of legitimacy for 
international law as an important response to crisis, rather than as being in crisis 
or producing crisis.6  Today, we see these narratives of international law 
proliferate in response to revived and reinvigorated strands of authoritarianism 
across the world. For instance, in the transition from the Trump administration 
to the Biden administration, a range of commentators heralded the latter for 
promising a return to a liberal world order that pulls back from the crisis of 
authoritarianism by embracing international law and international institutions. I 
argue instead that rather than redeem international law, we need to see the crisis-
space of the current moment as an opportunity to interrogate the dark side of 
international law, including its intimate imbrication with histories of racial 
capitalism over the last four hundred years. 
How did the crisis of racial capitalism boomerang into the crisis-space of 
authoritarianism that the world is confronting today?7 In thinking through this 
question, I turn to past histories of international law and crisis. This article draws 
from my earlier work critically analyzing two historical projects, one from the 
mid-nineteenth century and one from the mid-twentieth century; both tell a story 
about the politics of accountability and its institutional channeling into 
international law and judicial institutions.8 The first case I look at is Gary Bass’s 
account of Nuremberg in his history of post-war judicial processes as an 
 
 
5  For an analysis of how invocations of crisis empower particular strands of international conflict 
feminism See Karen Engle, Vasuki Nesiah and Diane Otto, “Feminist Approaches to International 
Law” in Jeffrey L Dunoff and Mark A Pollack, eds., International Legal Theory: Foundations and 
Frontiers, (Forthcoming with Cambridge University Press). 
6  See Dunoff and Pollack Ibid. for discussion of the constitutive role of ‘crisis’ in a range of subfields 
across international law. 
7  In using the term “boomerang” I echo Aime Cesaire and Hannah Arendt’s invocation of the term to 
speak to the relationship between violence against the colonized in the global south, and the violence 
of fascism in Europe. HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM (1973); AIMÉ CÉSAIRE, 
DISCOURSE ON COLONIALISM (Monthly Rev. Press 1972) (1955). 
8  The two articles I draw from are (1) Vasuki Nesiah, Doing History with Impunity, ANTI-IMPUNITY 
AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS AGENDA (Karen Engle, Zinaida Miller, & D.M. Davis eds., 2016), an earlier 
article that looks not only at Nuremberg but also engages with Bass’s discussion of Constantinople 
and The Hague, and (2) Vasuki Nesiah, Crimes Against Humanity: Racialized Subjects and 
Deracialized Histories, THE NEW HISTORIES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: RETRIALS  (Immi 
Tallgren & Thomas Skouteris, eds., 2019); a significantly shorter and revised version was published 
as Vasuki Nesiah, The Law of Humanity has a Canon: Translating Racialized World Order into 










234 NOTRE DAME J. INT’L & COMP. L.  vol. XI:2 
alternative to vengeance in the fight against impunity.9 For Bass this is 
inspiration for a future of international criminal law that can entrench the rule of 
law and a normatively grounded world order. The second case I look at is Jenny 
Martinez’s account of the mid-century tribunals that were instituted on diverse 
shores of the Atlantic Ocean to monitor the abolishing of the slave trade from 
1807 on.10 For Martinez this is inspiration for a future of international criminal 
law that can deal with race and racial injustice. Both these histories of 
international law, present courts and tribunals as marrying morality to power in 
response to the crisis of “radical evil”— a Kantian term that is perhaps most 
famous amongst international human rights lawyers from the title of Carlos 
Nino’s book Radical Evil on Trial.11 From Nuremberg’s trial of Nazi officials 
to the trial of the Argentinian military dictators, Nino argued for the preventive 
charge of international law through prosecutions in the crisis-space of human 
rights atrocity in facilitating transition to democracy . Nino’s articulates the 
governing rationale of international criminal law that international lawyers have 
found most compelling, often in the name of victims and as part of a vision of 
an international law anchored post-war world order. 
My analysis in this article draws on two separate papers I have previously 
published; each of which has a more extended engagement with the arguments 
of Bass and Martinez respectively. This article brings those distinct projects into 
conversation by examining the work of crisis space dynamics in redemptive 
teleologies about international law’s centrality to the international system in 
these different historical conjunctures, the aftermath of the holocaust in Bass and 
the aftermath of the international slave trade in Martinez. This article argues that 
when we attend to international law’s imbrication in the histories and legacies 
of slavery, colonialism, and other dimensions of racial capitalism, we may well 
discover that international law also worked to legitimize and empower the world 
order that enabled these crises. Thus, the Bass and Martinez histories of 
international law tell a story that purports to show international law as offering 
a progressive response to various moments of world crisis; however, closer 
examination may reveal that these histories frame and reframe the crisis-space 
of these moments in ways that deny and distract from the legacies of racial 
capitalism. Rather than focus only on international law and its response to fascist 
violence, we need to also look at how that response ignores, distracts from, or 
even facilitates colonial and neocolonial oppression. Rather than focus only on 
international law and its story of the abolition of the slave trade in the 19th 
century or its condemnation of genocide in the 20th century, we need to also look 
at international law’s history facilitating slavery and racial oppression. 
 
The Bass and Martinez interventions offer two examples of how crisis talk 
gets knit into a redemptive turn to history by noted scholars of international law 
and international relations. Both these liberal internationalist histories were 
written at different moments in the fortunes of international criminal law, but 
both advance a historical narrative that points towards a redemptive anti-
 
 
9  GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE POLITICS OF WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS 
(2000). 
10 JENNY S. MARTINEZ, THE SLAVE TRADE AND THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
(2012). 
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impunity telos. Bass’s Stay the Hand of Vengeance was published in 2000 at a 
moment of great optimism about ICL. The Rome Statute had been passed two 
years earlier, capping a decade long Grotian moment for international criminal 
law—moving from ad hoc tribunals in The Hague and Arusha to several rounds 
of drafting of a new statute for the international criminal court. If the end of the 
cold war and the spiral into an extended war in the Balkans threw international 
law into crisis, by the end of the 1990s, international law saw itself as having 
developed an effective response, not just to the Balkans but to wars and war 
crimes everywhere. Bass’s history told a story that situated the ICC within a 
century long honing of ICL’s normative, statutory and institutional muscle to 
fight impunity, rather than being just an ad hoc solution to the immediate crisis.12 
Over a decade later, in 2012, when Jenny Martinez published The Slave 
Trade and the Origins of International Humanitarian Law, the ICC had lost its 
luster and was being threatened with mass withdrawals from African Union 
(AU) countries as it confronted damning criticisms of a racist focus on Africa 
and Africans, while the west enjoyed impunity in Iraq, Afghanistan, and 
elsewhere. Responding to this legitimacy crisis, Martinez speaks to the 
progressive potential of ICL as illuminated with an even longer historical 
perspective that looks at the work of transnational tribunals in responding to the 
crisis of the international slave trade by helping implement its abolition in 
tribunals that were established a century before Nuremberg. In the following 
pages, I begin by thinking with and against Bass’s discussion of Nuremberg 
before moving back to Martinez’s 19th century history of the Freetown tribunals. 
The last section develops some concluding reflections about how we may move 
forward in thinking through the relationship between international law and crisis 
on the world stage in confronting authoritarianism today. 
 
 
I. NUREMBERG: “THE MOST SIGNIFICANT TRIBUTE THAT POWER HAS 
PAID TO REASON”13 
In his ambitious history of post-war justice on the international stage, Gary 
Bass seeks to establish the long history of war crimes tribunals and efforts 
towards such tribunals from Britain’s assessment of prosecutorial options post-
World War I (including preliminary efforts in that direction at Leipzig and 
Constantinople), through to the US led efforts at Nuremberg, and then on to the 
ad hoc tribunals of the ‘90s, leading up to the ICC. He presents these efforts as 
a rejection of impunity for accountability; a rejection of vengeful war for 
 
 
12 This was so despite the fact that the ICTY and its twin, the ICTR, are often referred to as ad hoc 
tribunals because their mandates are specific to each context; However, these UN creations are also 
situated by Bass and others in a historical pattern ( the ‘justice cascade’) of an increased turn to 
international criminal law that culminates in the ICC. In addition to Bass Ibid., see Kathryn Sikkink, 
THE JUSTICE CASCADE: HOW HUMAN RIGHTS PROSECUTIONS ARE CHANGING WORLD POLITICS 
(2012). 
13 See BASS, supra note 9, at 47. Bass quotes Robert Jackson’s opening statement at the trials to frame 
his own claims about Nuremberg’s significance in the history of war crimes adjudication. Jackson’s 
opening statement for the Prosecution at Nuremberg gave Bass’s book its subtitle and the broader 
theme that ties the fight against impunity for the wrongs of war to the legalist triumph over the quest 
for vengeance: “That four great nations, flushed with victory and stung with injury stay the hand of 
vengeance and voluntarily submit their captive enemies to the judgment of the law is one of the most 
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tribunalized justice.14 In his telling, these are way stations in the struggle for 
humanist idealism in liberal states’ international relations, and in this way they 
also become founding stones in international law’s development as it hones its 
response to global crises.15 His is a nuanced and complex account; it is not a 
story of the forces of justice moving forward with clarity of purpose and 
definitive institutional force; rather, it is a story of justice “lurching forward” 
unevenly and incrementally, emboldened at some points and compromised at 
others, but with forward momentum nevertheless. There are two struggles in 
Bass’s account: an internal struggle within liberal states for the better angels to 
triumph over the Kissingeresque realists, and an external struggle with so called 
illiberal states.16 With a direction and force forged through those battles against 
vengeance on the one hand, and impunity on the other, Bass claims there has 
been a long movement towards legalism and international justice as the more 
effective and noble response to the crisis of war crimes and mass atrocity. That 
response becomes embodied through international criminal law in “a well-
institutionalized international forum where such cases can be heard”; ultimately, 
this emerges as a story of fitful progress towards the rule of law and its 
redemption.  
Nuremberg looms large in the Bass narrative, and it is that part of the Bass 
story that I will focus on in this article because of its resonance with the dominant 
international law history of that episode as well.17 The trials are presented as 
performatively enacting the Allies’ moral authority in the defeat of fascism, 
embodied most crucially in this institutional commitment to international law as 
the foundation of the new post war world order. In Bass’s narrative, Nuremberg 
emerges as the historical, moral and institutional centerpiece; it is the linchpin 
that helps connect the cosmopolitan humanist dots from Leipzig to The Hague. 
This arc of the story translates as a progressive narrative of international law 
increasingly focused on the fight against impunity as it navigates the storms of 
the 20th century with the highest ideals of global citizenship as its loadstar. 
At the beginning of the century discussions about war crimes and the 
genocide against the Armenians leading into Versailles post-World War I 
represented a burgeoning universalism in responding to crisis, and the 
accompanying notion that humanity had a common stake in the conduct of war 
and peace. For Bass, this is the moment that births a notion of humanity that is 
grounded in collective moral condemnation of the inhuman, namely crimes that 
were so egregious as to be classified ‘crimes against humanity’. Yet these anti-
impunity intentions did not materialize in robust prosecutions of World War I 
war crimes. It is this gap between intent and legal action that was corrected with 
Nuremberg. Bass describes Nuremberg as a triumph against all odds. Indeed, 
when FDR and Churchill met in Quebec to discuss policy for the war’s end, they 
both signed a statement agreeing to summarily execute Nazi leadership.18 For 
Bass, the policy shift from executions to trials is a shift from vengeance to liberal 
 
 
14 See BASS, supra note 9, at 329-30.  
15 Id. at 37–38. Indeed, he says that a kernel of the international legal liberalism that matured into an ICL 
policy that culminated in the ICC was laid in the early 1800s in the aftermath of the Napoleonic wars.  
16 Id. at 186. As exemplified for instance by Nuremberg in contrast to Stalin’s prescription for mass 
executions.  
17 See generally id. Significantly, Tokyo is referenced by Bass but largely ignored, as his primary 
preoccupation is the Nuremberg trials. This is the fate of Tokyo in most human rights histories! 
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legalism that pulls the aftermath of WWII into the international human rights 
law history books. Bass describes the change in policy as one that emerged 
through a series of “David against Goliath” battles fought in the realms of public 
opinion,19 policy making,20 and international diplomacy21 to become what 
Nuremberg prosecutor Robert Jackson would famously pronounce as “the most 
significant tribute that power has ever paid to reason.”22 
Bass seeks to do several things in his depiction of the Nuremberg court as 
the unlikely hero of the postwar settlement that followed the severity of the 
WWII crisis-space. Most significantly, he wants to cast criminal prosecutions as 
an astonishing achievement of universalist ideals which emerge through an epic 
struggle against numerous obstacles and wide-ranging opposition. Anti-
impunity represents, in this narrative, a harnessing of the best of the American 
system’s cosmopolitan promise to the international legal response to war. 
Quoting Henry Stimson, American Secretary of War, in his effort to reform 
Germans “with the Bill of Rights and the Supreme Court,” Bass describes 
Nuremberg as a “trial proposal” that emerges from “the Constitution, the holy 
of holies in American domestic politics.”23 It is a humanist vision about the 
possibilities of a cosmopolitan peace that perseveres against the forces of evil 
and lays an international law foundation for a new world order.  
In addition to a celebration of Nuremberg as a flag for judicial due process 
rather than vengeance, Bass’s broader narrative is also interested in making the 
case that Nuremberg clarifies that the principled commitment to the political 
virtues of law and due process is Ariadne’s thread helping liberal states confront 
crisis by giving them a sense of direction and purpose; it also helps, Bass argues, 
retrospectively make sense of a century marked by war and wartime impunity 
and the maze of conflicting policy paths that different international actors 
advocated at different moments. As he tells the story, from Constantinople to 
Nuremberg, the mantle of liberal idealism shifts from Britain to the United States 
as the voice of progress in a universalist struggle against impunity. If the impulse 
 
 
19 Id. at 169. When the American public was surveyed, summary executions against the German and 
Japanese leadership trumped all other options in public opinion polls. The legalistic response became 
celebrated and framed in patriotic rhetoric regarding the American commitment to law only after the 
trials had begun. Indeed, for many, it was only after they were completed.  
20 Id. Bass pays much attention to the internal battle within the American cabinet, with Secretary of War 
Henry Stimson, who advocated trials, waging a long battle against Secretary of State Hans 
Morgenthau, who favored summary executions and the blitzing of German industrial power. President 
Roosevelt shifted to a more temperate position when it became apparent that it was more politically 
expedient to ensure Germany survived as a viable trading partner.  
21 Id. at 173–80. Bass layers his depiction of the internal policy battles within the higher echelons of 
American policymaking with an account of the external battles on the highest echelons of international 
relations.  The US push for trials battled against the British and Soviet preference for the execution 
option. Eventually Robert Jackson, who later served as America’s Chief Prosecutor in Nuremberg, 
negotiated terms for the London Charter that reflected the American vision for a war crimes tribunal. 
Finally, Bass notes that the scope of the Nuremberg prosecutions was also one that emerged through 
fraught negotiations within the US and amongst allies. In the early stages of negotiation, there was 
much support for focusing only on acts of German aggression that entailed breaches of international 
law against other nations. There was doubt about whether there were political and legal grounds to 
also take on atrocities within Germany. Thus, initially the Holocaust itself was going to be side stepped 
and treated as an internal matter. Eventually, however, with lobbying from the American Jewish 
diaspora and discussions within the American team negotiating the London charter, the U.S. position 
called for a broader focus on anti-impunity. This expanded prosecution agenda succeeded in winning 
the day in negotiations with the allies as well.  
22 Id. at 147.  








238 NOTRE DAME J. INT’L & COMP. L.  vol. XI:2 
to prosecute crimes against humanity emerges from British idealists coming to 
terms with the ashes of World War I, their vision at that moment get vindicated 
by American idealists who argued for Nuremberg from the ashes of World War 
II. The passage revealed by Ariadne’s thread through the maze of conflicting 
national interests and competing visions of international relations was gradual 
and challenging but each step taken in the direction of anti-impunity is an 
achievement. Indeed, Bass repeatedly notes that each step forward is not to be 
taken for granted. It was not inevitable; Nuremberg was the majestic triumph of 
high-minded commitment to legalism despite the lesser resolve of allies and 
fellow travelers.  
 
A. RESITUATING MID-20TH CENTURY INSTITUTION BUILDING: A 
TRIBUTE TO ACCOUNTABILITY OR IMPUNITY? 
The invocation of a crisis-space is by necessity a portrayal that includes 
somethings within the frame and excludes others, it highlights some events and 
ignores others. In Bass’s framing, the focus is on the crisis of WWII criminality 
– and this is where he gets his optimistic portrayal                                                                             
of international law’s response as manifest in the Nuremberg trials. By attending 
to how Bass’ framing delimits how he sees the problem, and concomitantly, how 
he assesses the work of international law, we can also attend for what is excluded 
from his analysis of crisis and how we might then assess the work of 
international law differently. For instance if we look at the war crimes of those 
who prosecuted at Nuremberg, not just those who were prosecuted, Nuremberg 
emerges not only as a symbol of the struggle against impunity, but as an icon of 
impunity. International law facilitates the equation of victors’ justice with justice 
as such, the equation of impunity for victors as anti-impunity.24 Consider, for 
instance, the week in August 1945 when the London Charter was drafted. The 
London Charter, or the Charter of the International Military Tribunal as it is 
officially titled (and to which Bass gives the Americans the central role in 
establishing), details the mandate and procedure of the Nuremberg trials. It was 
signed by the Allies on August 8, 1945, sandwiched between the US bombing 
of Hiroshima on August 6 and the US bombing of Nagasaki on August 9. The 
‘crisis’ of these bombings for the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki does not 
enter Bass’s crisis space or disturb his positing of Nuremberg as a choice of anti-
impunity over impunity, of American liberal legalism over vengeance, or even, 
in the words of Robert Jackson, of reason over power. 
 
That second week of August 1945, encapsulates how impunity for crimes 
against non-White peoples can be braided with a delimited commitment to 
accountability. The weight of Nuremberg, Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the annals 
of international law bake these racial logic into the international law canon, and 
its legitimation of imperial power.25 In Bass’s narrative, America’s imperial 
 
 
24 See also Mahmood Mamdani, Beyond Nuremberg: The Historical Significance of the Post-Apartheid 
Transition in South Africa, ANTI-IMPUNITY AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS AGENDA (Karen Engle, Zinaida 
Miller, & D.M. Davis eds., 2016). 
25 Jack Goldsmith, The Shadow of Nuremberg, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2012). Obama, for instance, has 
employed the Nuremberg trials themselves to make the argument about American exceptionalism 
arguing that “the Nuremberg trials” were “part of what made us different” in ways that “taught the 
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power is ignored or rendered as a benevolent servant to the democracy and the 
rule of law rather than white supremacy or imperial conquest. 26 These 
contradictions may not simply be dimensions of American empire, but may well 
be more central to international legal liberalism and the world order which it 
birthed: from the nation-state27 to human rights28 to “humanitarian reason.”29 
Thus contra Bass, we suggest that the “dark side of virtue” in international law 
may be central to the foundational concepts of liberalism and their institutional 
and legal embodiment on the international stage.30 
The delimiting of the accountability mandate of Nuremberg is striking. The 
London Charter not only sidestepped its twinned siblings, Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, it also ignored a host of allegations about Allied war crimes that had 
taken place over the duration of the war.31 These crimes included civilian air 
raids such as the bombing of Dresden by the British and Americans,32 wartime 
rapes by occupying Russian soldiers in Berlin, the killing of German prisoners 
of war in Dachau, and many more acts of torture, ill treatment, and killings of 
both civilians and enemy combatants.33 The London Charter designates the 
court’s subject matter jurisdiction as crimes against peace (a precursor to the 
modern crime of aggression), war crimes, and crimes against humanity. 
However, the Charter also indicates that this is not a “universalist” approach to 
these crimes; rather, the Tribunal was established “for the trial and punishment” 
of persons committing these crimes only when they are “acting in the interests 
of the European Axis countries.”34 Thus, the statement of the Court’s jurisdiction 
in advancing a measure of accountability for some is tethered to its advancing 
the impunity of others in all these other instances of crimes against peace, war 
crimes, and crimes against humanity. 
Significantly, Bass’s narration of the Nuremberg story focuses primarily on 
the development of an American post-war policy on trials and the negotiations 
 
 
26 After the Attack…The War on Terrorism, MONTHLY REVIEW (Nov. 1, 2001). For example, in the wake 
of post 9/11 U.S. strikes on Afghanistan in October 2001, the editors of Monthly Review began their 
November issue noting that “in Britain, empire was justified as a benevolent ‘white man’s burden.’ 
And in the United States, empire does not even exist; ‘we’ are merely protecting the causes of freedom, 
democracy and justice worldwide.” See also Michael Ignatieff who defends American empire in YORK 
EMPIRE LITE: NATION BUILDING IN BOSNIA, KOSOVO, AFGHANISTAN (2003). 
27 See generally ANTHONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (2005). 
28 See generally COSTAS DOUZINAS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND EMPIRE: THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF 
COSMOSPOLITANISM (2007). See also Martti Koskenniemi, Between Impunity and Show Trials, 6 MAX 
PLANCK YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS L., 1 (2002). 
29 DIDIER FASSIN, HUMANITARIAN REASON: A MORAL HISTORY OF THE PRESENT (RACHEL GOMME 
TRANS., 2011). 
30 See DAVID KENNEDY, THE DARK SIDES OF VIRTUE: REASSESSING INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIANISM (2004). In fact the relationship between impunity and anti-impunity, may well be 
the geo-political projection of the psychological construction of selfhood, where splitting the domain 
of impunity and the domain of anti-impunity is also a negotiation between those two domains and the 
actors relevant to each. See also NATHANIEL BERMAN, PASSION AND AMBIVALENCE: COLONIALISM, 
NATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Randall Lesaffer ed., 2012). 
31 SEE EVA FAUEN, TOP 10 ALLIED WAR CRIMES OF WORLD WAR II, LISTVERSE (DEC. 14, 2012), 
HTTP://LISTVERSE.COM/2012/12/14/TOP-10-ALLIED-WAR-CRIMES-OF-WORLD-WAR-II. 
32 See KURT VONNEGUT, SLAUGHTERHOUSE FIVE (1991); RICHARD OVERY, The Post-War Debate, 
FIRESTORM: THE BOMBING OF DRESDEN,1945, 123–42 (Paul Addison & Jeremy, eds., 2006).  
33 See HAROLD MARCUSE, LEGACIES OF DACHAU: THE USES AND ABUSES OF A CONCENTRATION CAMP, 
1933–2001, (2001) (book by Herbert Marcuse’s grandson). 
34 Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, and 
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amongst the Allies that led to the London Charter. There is very little on the 
actual trials themselves, and he pays no attention to the specifics of the cases or 
what Jackson, in his summation, described as the “Trial’s mad and melancholy 
record.”35 The establishment of the court emerges as sufficient achievement for 
those championing accountability through international law. However, there is 
value in taking Nuremberg outside the debate about the pros and cons of such 
efforts to understand its significance, because here too we can see the 
accountability conversation as a footnote to a larger project. In particular, there 
is value in looking at the work done by Nuremberg in the post-war global 
landscape: a performative enactment of exceptionalism for a world audience 
(one which continues to be performed to this day)36 to amplify the moral 
authority claimed by the Allies in shaping the post-war world order. After all 
this was not only a post war moment but a post colonialism moment; anti 
colonial movements had swept across the global south and most countries were 
in different stages of achieving independence. Already, the framing of the war 
effort itself as a fight for democracy and liberty distracted from the 
embarrassment of colonialism, not only on the global stage but also in various 
national theaters.37 However, going forward, what would prove even more 
significant would be Nuremberg’s place in the architecture of post-colonial 
global governance. 
The narrative of Nuremberg as an ode to liberal global governance is an 
anthem to the world order birthed in the ashes of the war and its claim to 
universalist legitimacy even as formerly colonized countries were emerging as 
nation-states. Perhaps this is why even the details of the trials are ignored by 
Bass; the institution of the court itself is the signature of global governance 
announcing a new era – not just ending the war but announcing a new era of 
American hegemony in this post-colonial period. It contributes to the 
endorsement of the position of the US led allies as arbiters of a new world order 
in which their military victory is entrenched not only through the anti-
democratic design of the Security Council, but also through the international 
financial institutions (“IFIs”) established in that same period. The United 
Nations and the Security Council were established in October 1945. Only a few 
weeks later, in November 1945, the Nuremberg trials got underway according 
to the terms drafted in the London Charter. The next month, the International 
Monetary Fund was established and (together with the World Bank) went on to 
push a plethora of policies that continued the “planned misery” that 
characterized colonialism.38 The momentous international institution-building 
that took place in the last three months of 1945 produced organizations that were 
deeply intertwined, not just in their origins, but also in their trajectories. 
Scholars such a Elizabeth Bogwardt, Jessica Whyte and Quinn Slobodian 
have traced different dimensions of these intertwined paths. Bogwardt has 
 
 
35 Nuremberg Trial Proceedings, Vol. 19, Day 187, July 26, 1946, The Avalon Project, Yale Law School. 
36 See Jack Goldsmith, The Shadow of Nuremberg, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2012), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/22/books/review/justice-and-the-enemy-nuremberg-9-11-and-the-
trial-of-khalid-sheikh-mohammed-by-william-shawcross-book-review.html.  
37 See, e.g., AURIOL WEINGOLD, CHURCHILL, ROOSEVELT AND INDIA: PROPAGANDA DURING WW II 
(2008). Auriol Weingold’s story on Churchill’s use of the war in catalyzing US animus towards the 
“Quit India” movement. 
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argued that Nuremberg, Bretton Woods, and the United Nations were projects 
in the three-part institutional architecture designed to empower America in post-
war global governance.39 Bogwardt describes this brave new world as an 
achievement bringing to life the blueprint of the 1941 Atlantic Charter that 
expressed the United Kingdom’s and United States’ joint interests. In the 
Atlantic Charter, the Anglo-American alliance declared that “after the final 
destruction of Nazi tyranny,” it aimed “to see established a peace which 
will . . . afford assurance that all the men in all lands may live out their lives in 
freedom from fear and want,” thereby employing various euphemisms which 
linked the agenda of fighting the Nazis with the military and economic agendas 
of the Allies.40 In tracing the intellectual history of that economic agenda, both 
Whyte and Slobodian describe the institutionalization of a “neo-liberal model of 
world governance”41 , in countering decolonization and the prospect of 
democratization of the international order. Nuremberg can be situated not only 
in the history of war crimes prosecutions, but also in the history of transnational 
judicial bodies that became central to this model. While Slobodian does not 
make the connection to Nuremberg, he speaks of the institutional vision of that 
model as entailing the “creation of supranational judicial bodies like the 
European Court of Justice and the WTO to override national legislation that 
might disrupt the global rights of capital.42 It is not only that Nuremberg was a 
supranational judicial body, but that it also spoke to the notion of a global 
adjudication of political morality that trumped that of the nation-state precisely 
at the moment when the majority of the world’s people were forming themselves 
into nation-states. Moreover, as in Bass’s narrative, Nuremberg is often taken as 
the symbol of human rights  and that supranational archimedan perspective. As 
both Slobodian and Whyte emphasize, human rights (‘the morals of the market” 
as Whyte puts it) was especially important to this story; it is what tethers the 
post-war human rights regime that Nuremberg represents with the agendas of 
the neoliberal model of world governance that worked to defeat decolonization 
of the new world order in the postcolonial moment. 
The most significant implication of the story of the interlinked post-war 
institutional projects resituates Nuremberg in the wider landscape of global 
governance in relation both to “peace and security,” as well as to trade and 
political economy. As we have discussed Bass’s account of Nuremberg is the 
centerpiece in a history of 20th century international relations through a narrative 
about accountability for war crimes. The historical arc of this story ignores, and 
implicitly endorses, the post-war settlement and the inauguration of what some 
might call the era of neo-colonialism.43 In resituating Nuremberg in this way I 
have tried to reexamine the work of international law and international 
institutions in this historical conjuncture. 
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For many states, the real stakes may not have been criminal justice but 
various alternative projects, including particular territorial, economic, and 
governance agendas that moved forward without opposition partly because post-
war criminal justice measures got equated with justice as such. As I have 
discussed in greater detail elsewhere, there is a parallel between Nuremberg and 
the other waystations (Constantinople, The Hague)  in Bass’s narrative of 
international crisis and international law.44 For instance, just as Nuremberg 
becomes the story about accountability in ways that advance a redemptive 
history endorsing the post-war II world order, ICL institutions of the Hague era 
served a parallel function in the post-Cold War world order.  Just as the 
prosecution of German officials for war crimes at Nuremberg contributed to the 
legitimacy of international legal institutions in ways that distract from the 
impunity enjoyed by others for war crimes as monstrous as Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki. The work of the International Criminal Court in the name of 
accountability, stood alongside the refusal of accountability for atrocities that 
resulted from the US led war and occupation of Afghanistan and Ira in the very 
same moment of the ICC’s work. Moreover, in all these cases, a story of crisis 
that focusses on war crimes and short, intense periods of extraordinary violence 
normalizes systematic abuses and ordinary or “slow violence.” The ambitious 
century-long scope of Bass’s narrative, and the intertwined role of legal 
argument and political maneuvering in his portrayal of international courts as 
champions of accountability and human rights in responding to international 
crisis, makes him a particularly valuable interlocutor for our discussion. Bass 
sees a unidirectional arrow from Constantinople to Nuremberg to The Hague. 
Strategic jostling by key political players on the international stage, the gradual 
development of a global human rights consciousness, international institutions, 
and the professional activists who staffed them all play a role in ensuring this 
arrow stayed its course. In Bass’s story, although the human rights and 
accountability arrow may shoot straight ahead in some periods, while lurching 
forward unsteadily in others, the directionality is one of liberal states becoming 
more “liberal” and matching their political behavior to their political ethics. This 
framing does enormous work as a redemptive narrative that heralds liberal 
pieties of global North states as being “in the interests of humanity.”45 
In contrast to Bass’s account, we have foregrounded arrows whizzing in 
other directions, including toward impunity. Moreover, at various historical 
junctures the significance of international criminal tribunals may not lie in their 
anti-impunity work but in dynamics that pertain to other dimensions of 
international politics such as the establishment of the IFIs and related institutions 
alongside Nuremberg as referenced above. This part of the article sought to 
situate the notion of international legal accountability not as a trans-historical 
high-minded ideal that travels from Constantinople to The Hague via 
Nuremberg, but as one that has had particular and contested backstories with 
specific political stakes in each of these moments of “tribunalizing justice.” 
Accordingly, we have foregrounded areas such as global political economy, 
distribution, and redistribution as central to how we interpret international law’s 
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accountability initiatives and situate their relationship to global governance as 
a whole.  
By foregrounding the structures and interpretive disputes that attend 
invocations of accountability, we can look at what work “accountability” is 
actually doing that warrants critical scrutiny—such as the narrowing of the 
human rights agenda to accountability only for extraordinary as opposed to 
ordinary violence, or for individuals rather than structures. Significantly, in 
Nuremberg as in the other contexts Bass discusses, accountability projects may 
have legitimized the dominant global order in the name of liberal political ethics 
and therefore helped entrench impunity in other realms. In my counter-account, 
I have highlighted how the domain of accountability initiatives in international 
criminal law has been limited to certain demarcated zones—primarily war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and crimes of aggression (and their 
canonical definitions)—while there has been wide impunity for atrocities such 
as exploitative terms of international trade which enable and condition socio-
economic abuses. Similarly, my counternarrative has drawn attention to the 
ways in which the mantle of legitimacy that is vested in claims to accountability 
has authorized companion agendas by association and delegitimized challenges 
to the dominant order as ones that risk empowering war criminals and criminal 
regimes. In other words, the dominance of the narrative that there is a turn to 
accountability in international law is itself doing work that I have aimed to 
unpack and critique. For our purposes, this is particularly telling as a story about 
the labor of international law in Nuremberg, the most celebrated incident for 
celebrants of international law’s response to crisis. 
 
 
II. FREETOWN: THE CROSSROADS OF SLAVERY/COLONIALISM/RACIAL 
CAPITALISM 
For many advocates of international law’s salutary history, the backdrop of 
Nuremberg heralding the promise of the ICC when the Rome Statute came into 
force in July 2002. However, a decade after the ICC had opened its doors, its 
own record provided a less optimistic prognosis about the future of international 
criminal law. In 2012, when Martinez’s book came out, the ICC had proven 
ineffective in responding to world crises, including and especially the atrocities 
by America and its allies in Iraq and Afghanistan. Moreover, when it did act, the 
ICC faced charges of wielding racist and colonial prosecutorial policies. It is in 
the context of this contemporary legitimacy crisis that Martinez steps back a 
century before Nuremberg to look for alternative inspiration for the ICC’s 
promise in addressing struggles over structural racism in the world order and she 
finds that alternative inspiration in Freetown, Sierra Leone. Freetown was one 
of a number of locations along the Atlantic coasts where tribunals were 
established with the authority to monitor the abolition of the slave trade in the 
middle of the 19th century. They were instituted under the aegis of Anglo-
European and Anglo-American political legal and military authority on 
territories that had been colonized on both sides of the Atlantic. They were 
known as ‘mixed tribunals’ to indicate their transnational legal provenance, 
jurisdiction, and staffing. The ‘mixed tribunal’ in Freetown was by far the most 
significant of these. Courts were initially established in Brazil (an Anglo-
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court), and Sierra Leone (which included courts representing all of the parties). 
Over the following decades, Anglo-Portuguese courts were also set up in 
Luanda, Boa Vista, Spanish Town, and Cape Town.46 During the course of their 
existence, the Sierra Leone courts held that 65,000 captured men and women 
should be freed because they had been illegally trafficked in violation of the 
abolition of the slave trade; the courts in Havana, Rio, and elsewhere released 
another 15,000 Africans. While Nuremberg is the most famous international 
judicial institution, even most international criminal law scholars and 
professionals do not know about these international tribunals that were 
established a century earlier, also in the name of supranational judicial 
accountability. Martinez seeks to rescue them from obscurity and offers them up 
as inspiration for the future of the international law. Her history of the politico-
legal subject ‘humanity’ in international law reaches back to these records to 
claim their humanist origins and recuperate the laws and institutions involved in 
the abolition of the international slave trade as signifying the salutary juridical 
and moral promise of international law. 
The story that Martinez tells also begins with a double crisis—the brutalities 
of the international slave trade was a crisis in itself, but in addition, the 
contradictions between slavery and the age of rights also raised questions of 
legitimacy for the revolutions, constitutions and normative claims of the 
imperial and slave holding powers heralding the rights of man in this same 
period.  In 1807, when American and British legislators ruled the slave trade 
illegal, slavery itself was legal and thriving in Caribbean sugar plantations, 
Columbian gold mines, and American cotton fields. The triangular trade played 
a critical role in the political economy of the industrial revolutions that twinned 
the liberal revolutions of the late seventeenth century.47 This was the heyday of 
colonial expansion in Africa. The political economy of slavery and colonialism 
were intertwined in complex ways across the Atlantic and was equally central to 
the social, political, and economic underpinnings of these twin revolutions.  
 
If the logic of the “Age of Rights” was predicated on, and promised, the 
self-possession of the white man, the fact that these coexisted with slavery and 
the slave trade seemed to indicate that that logic also implicitly, yet 
unequivocally, affirmed and enacted the dispossession of the black man. 
Accordingly, the movement for the abolition of the international slave trade is 
often situated in accounts of a developing international legal order that sought 
to resolve that contradiction and recognize an evolving rights consciousness on 
both sides of the Atlantic as its anchor going forward. Dominant histories of 
human rights and humanitarianism seek to redeem the age of rights by framing 
 
 
46 See Leslie Bethel, The Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade: Britain, Brazil and the Slave Trade 
Question 1807-1869, in CAMBRIDGE LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES (David Joslin & John Street, eds., 
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the French and American revolutions as a founding moment in shaping a notion 
of humanity that organically evolved into the movement for the abolition of the 
international slave trade as a crime against humanity. In this vein, Lynn Hunt’s 
story of the invention of human rights focuses on the French revolution and the 
“rights cascade” it engendered. Similarly, Adam Horscheild situated the 
movement to abolish the slave trade and the passage of the 1807 abolition 
legislation as the first human rights movement, extending the logic of the 
Atlantic revolutions. 48 Jenny Martinez describes the slave trade as the “original 
‘crimes against humanity’” (CAH) and the ‘Mixed Tribunals’ established to 
monitor abolition of the trade as offering a “bridge” to the international criminal 
court (ICC) today.49 In her telling, this ‘bridge to the future’ is constructed by 
judicious institutional purpose in the name of humanity.50 In a context where the 
ICC has been accused of anti-Africa bias and a neo-colonial prosecutorial 
record, the bridge to the mixed commissions is seen to carry with it redemptive 
inspiration for tribunals mandated with embroidering human rights and 
humanitarianism on international law’s future.  
 
A. RESITUATING MID-19TH CENTURY INSTITUTION BUILDING AND THE 
MYTHOLOGY OF A POST-RACIAL ICL 
The links between Mixed Commissions and contemporary ICL may be 
tenuous in terms of influence and impact, but they are instructive in 
understanding the backstory (in this case the abolition of the slave trade in the 
name of a race-transcending humanity’) that contemporary ICL historians see as 
most relevant to ICL legitimacy. Historians of ICL, such as Martinez, see the 
slave trade as racial exploitation and have done important work on how the 
category of race travelled in different European slave trade systems.51 However, 
the potential they attribute to the human rights revolutions and the mixed 
commissions they have supposedly birthed is precisely their transcendence of 
race in the name of humanity. My interest in this history of the mixed tribunals 
is in probing the work of invoking race transcendence and the mixed 
commissions as the origin story of international criminal law, and in particular 
the laws and norms of CAH. The bridge of CAH may well be a bridge between 
mixed tribunals and the ICC, but the story it tells may not be a testament to the 
law of humanity but an indictment of it. 
The repression of race in the historical narrative of then and now is a 
precondition for telling the story of empire and slavery in the mid-Atlantic as a 
story of emancipation. Race is foundational to the plot of Atlantic slavery, so to 
repress that memory and render race invisible in the work of the mixed 
 
 
48 In 1807, the British Parliament and American Congress banned the international slave trade. During 
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tribunals requires an elaborate defensive structure, and it is the juridical category 
of humanity that helps forge those defences in the histories told by the discipline 
and the memories it represses. Both ever-present, and ever-elusive, race and 
racism have a schizophrenic life in international criminal law histories of these 
tribunals as part of the first initiative to combat “crimes against humanity” in 
those terms. The terms of crimes against humanity are understood as referring 
to a colorblind category of humanity that had no explicit racial reference but 
were saturated with latent racial significance.52 The notion of humanity posited 
as the ‘origin’ of human rights and signifying the promise and potential of 
international law is thus shaped by a redemptive universality and a pivotal 
erasure of racialized power. As critical race theorists Richard Delagado and Jean 
Stefancic have noted in their discussion of American jurisprudence, the very 
language of law carries with it a canonical interpretation predicated on silencing 
questions of race and power: “the law does have a canon. It consists of terms 
like ‘just,’ ‘fair,’ ‘equal,’ ‘equal opportunity,’ ‘unfair to innocent whites,’ ‘nice,’ 
‘deserving,’ and ‘meritorious,’ all with canonical meanings that reflect our sense 
of how things ought to be, namely much as they are.”53 Racialized structures and 
imaginaries hide in plain sight in histories of these tribunals as an embryonic 
ICL—present everywhere yet not acknowledged anywhere.  
The weight of race as part of the legal architecture, as well as the everyday 
experience of the law was nowhere more evident than at the doors of the Mixed 
Commissions. Here, white judges (presorted according to their nationality) 
determined the fate of black men and women hovering in an interregnum 
between a regime of property law and a regime of colonial law, objects of 
property or subjects of colonial rule. Fanon’s words from a century later could 
well have been reporting the work of those Commissions: “When I look for man 
in European lifestyle and technology I see a constant denial of man, an avalanche 
of murders.”54 The racialized peopling of these commissions have a particular 
grammar, juridical and ethical, that shapes central features of contemporary 
international criminal law and its claims to act in the name of humanity. Fanon 
is here deftly connecting what he would call the “fact of Blackness” with the 
structures of racial genocide, at once both epistemic and economic, a matter of 
imagination and a matter of physical violence. 
 
Attention to the political economy of the slave trade helps to connect the 
dots even more tangibly. Historians of the slave economy have argued that over 
the course of the early 18th century, the abolition of the international slave trade 
became intertwined with the sustaining of slavery as such.55 Thus, a central 
dimension of the backstory to the abolition of the slave trade is that there was a 
divergence in the profit circuits of the slave trade, and the profit circuits of slave 
holding. For some sectors of the plantation economy in North America, and 
arguably for their industrial partners in Manchester and elsewhere, addressing 
their labor needs through the market in slaves who had been already brought to 
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North America was more profitable than depending on the international trade. 
Thus, many of the advocates of the abolition of the international trade argued 
for it on the theory that it would help ensure that slaves in the national market 
will be more valuable. There would be added incentive for slave owners to 
ensure the health and wellbeing of slaves they argued, and this in turn would 
make slavery a more sustainable social structure. The support for domestic 
slavery was not uniform but it is significant that when the question of fighting 
for a more universal emancipation came up in the Society for Effecting the 
Abolition of the Slave Trade (the organization that led the social movement for 
the abolition of the trade) only one of the twelve founding members, Granville 
Sharpe, supported full emancipation.56 Many of the other prominent supporters 
of the abolition were not opposed to slavery as an institution. William 
Wilberforce’s parliamentary speeches made the case for how slave plantations 
in the West Indies will profit from the abolition of the international trade.57 In 
sum, the humanitarian imperatives underlying the creation of the Mixed 
Commissions were conjoined with a complex of other dynamics defining what 
qualified as a crime, including chattel slavery.  
In her pathbreaking 1993 essay, Whiteness as Property, legal scholar Cheryl 
Harris described how the project of racialization was not only about identity and 
affiliation but also, fundamentally, a project of stealth material distribution. 
“Whiteness as property,” Harris argues, “has carried and produced a heavy 
legacy. It is a ghost that has haunted the political and legal domains . . . Only 
rarely declaring its presence.”58 Legal struggles against structural racism entail 
remembering, naming, and rendering visible the work of racial architectures, 
unpacking the mechanics of invisibility, and exposing how racialized systems 
drive the plot. In this case, it is about foregrounding how racial capitalism, 
including the specific contours of slavery and empire, was central to the 
structures and ideologies of the seventeenth and eighteenth world order. This 
includes the work of the Mixed Commissions where the privilege of whiteness, 
both extraordinary and banal, manifest in travel through nationality and property 
ownership without having to declare its presence. Evincing a different kind of 
invisibility, blackness hovered between object and subject, property and persons, 
past and future, an erased body on the free seas in the age of liberty.  
 
The erasure of ‘race’ from ICL history is partly effected by translating 
questions regarding the racial ordering of the Atlantic world into legal questions 
about the reach of abolition in the British Parliament and American Congress 
and the purview of maritime law, the resolution of disputes through application 
of tribunal procedure and the determining of relevant colonial authority, the 
defining of social change through inter-European treaties and the constituting of 
legal institutions. Law (from the various pieces of national legislation abolishing 
the slave trade in Britain, the U.S., France, and elsewhere), and legal institutions 
(the Mixed Commissions as well as the national courts that encountered slave 
trade cases), provided different kinds of cloaks of invisibility that translated the 
politics of race into technical legal questions regarding nationality and 
jurisdiction, property and prize law, legal personhood and juridical freedom. 
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Emanating from imperial claims over land and sea, Europeans (often the 
English Navy) asserted jurisdiction over Africans on ships brought before the 
commission to sort them as objects of property law or subjects of colonial law. 
If a ship was flying under the flag of one of the treaty parties and detained under 
suspicion of being embroiled in the slave trade, it was brought to a Mixed 
Commission where that country was represented.59 Thus, Europe proceeded to 
carve up the Atlantic even before Europe carved up Africa at the infamous Berlin 
conference.60 The carving up of inter-imperial oceanic jurisdiction through 
Mixed Commissions anchor the role of Europe and America in a racialized 
structure of world order.61 ICL historians describe how each exercise in 
adjudication regarding jurisdiction assessed the applicability of the law 
abolishing the trade by focusing on the registration of the ship, nationality of  
ship owners, and the circumstances of capture. The privileges, vulnerabilities, 
and hierarchies that accompanied racial difference were central to matters such 
as nationality and ship ownership so race gets constituted in the details of that 
adjudicatory process without race having to be named. The law defining the 
crime was ostensibly race neutral, and mobilized language regarding abstract 
legal persons, their ownership claims over ships and people, and the nationality 
under which the ship was registered.  
Thus, an equally significant part of the legacy for contemporary 
international law is how the causes of abolition and imperial consolidation 
converged. Thus, scholars learned in the legal history of empire have traced how 
the imperatives for extending and tightening the reach of the British imperial 
constitution led to a renewed interest in establishing legal authority over the high 
seas.62 This led to a ramping up of efforts for policing piracy and the slave trade, 
and the establishing of an enforcement mechanism throughout the high seas. 
Intertwined with this were the long reach of the Napoleonic wars, the war of 
1812 and a series of other inter-imperial tensions that made the nationality of the 
court adjudicating cases a particularly fraught issue. Setting up tribunals through 
bilateral treaties was one way of negotiating these tensions and constituted an 
approach of particular value to the British whose imperial star was ascendant but 
not uncontested.  
If the laws of jurisdiction and nationality are one dimension of the legal 
regime of mixed commissions, another dimension, equally saturated with 
competing imperial interests, was prize law. The naval patrols that brought in 
slave ships became eligible for what was termed salvage, bounty or prize money. 
Maritime law incentivized ships to intervene when ships were in peril (because 
of storms and other natural causes), but also when they were suspected of illegal 
activities, including violation of the laws of war and neutrality, piracy, and the 
 
 
59 Through the lens of ICL, arguably the Mixed Commissions were early precursors to what we now 
term hybrid courts. However, with the history of the Mixed Commissions faded from the collective 
memory of ICL, they were not in fact the precedent or inspiration for the hybrid courts that were set 
up in Sierra Leone, Timor, or Cambodia. The more proximate point of reference for these were of 
course the lessons learned from the ad hoc tribunals. 
60 LAUREN BENTON, A SEARCH FOR SOVEREIGNTY: LAW AND GEOGRAPHY IN EUROPEAN EMPIRES, 
1400-1900 43 (2010). 
61 In addition to maritime laws regulating colonization, war, piracy, trade, and the registration of a ship’s 
nationality, treaties regarding abolition also anchored jurisdictional boundaries within the Atlantic 
Ocean. 








2021 THE CRISIS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW HISTORIES 249 
slave trade.63 Prize law functioned in tandem with treaties regarding the abolition 
of the slave trade to further regulate what counted as legitimate and illegitimate 
capture, and if African men and women on board were freed or shipped back 
across the Atlantic with their captors.64 There were immediate material rewards 
for the ship captains who pursued slave ships if they were able to prove that the 
cargo was illicit. There was no question of any recompense for the slaves 
themselves even when it was a slave rebellion that catalyzed the bringing of a 
ship to harbor.65 What is at stake in slave-trade contingent prize law is not just 
real property, but property in racial privilege—a racially contingent property 
right to implement the abolition.66 
The precarity of personhood recognized in every mixed commission is 
underscored when situating the law abolishing the slave trade in the market 
logics of the trade. The prohibition drove up the price of slaves so there was 
augmented profit incentive to trade slaves; thus, legal abolition played a complex 
role in the calculation of risk and 25 per cent of slaves in the transatlantic slave 
trade were transported in the half century that following the prohibition. In this 
way, the political economy of the traffic in persons cast its shadow in both the 
revenue and loss columns of the structural beneficiaries of the slave trade, 
linking private law and the law of nations, law regulating private property, and 
law regulating international trade. The recognition of the captured African as a 
legal person conjoined a certain sort of juridical freedom for the captured, a 
certain sort of financial bounty for the patrolling officers, and a certain sort of 
normative legitimacy for the laws and institutions of slave trade abolition. This 
conjoining of the interests of the dispossessed and the self-possessed, the victims 
and the beneficiaries, is an ‘achievement’ of the deracinated definition of law 
and humanity and an achievement for this ICL enhancing story of origins. Race 
is rendered invisible even in legal principles (such as abolition) that purport to 
hold racism to account. 
The judicial construction of freedom is a powerful register of the complex 
race translation work of the law of nations. Captured Africans seesawed between 
legal property and juridical freedom, and concomitantly, seesawed in between 
being valued as cargo and valued as persons—it all depended on whether the 
captured man or woman would be successfully trafficked to great profit, or 
forcibly freed if the ship was hauled into a Mixed Commission. The majority of 
ships that came before the Commissions had captured Africans on board and the 
court had to determine the terms of liability and free the would-be slaves. The 
men and women who had been captured aboard these ships hailed from across 
the African continent. It is significant, however, that the courts ordered their 
release but imposed no further responsibilities on the slavers to ensure they were 
able to go home. Thus, in the majority of cases, the ‘freed’ found themselves 
 
 
63 The Act abolishing the slave trade specified bounties of “the Sum of Forty Pounds lawful Money of 
Great Britain for every Man, or Thirty Pounds of like Money for every Women, or Ten Pounds of like 
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hundreds or thousands of miles from home, in an environment where they did 
not speak the local language and did not have the resources or geographic 
knowledge to return to their families. By mid-century, Freetown had over 40,000 
people from across the continent who spoke over a hundred languages.67 Thus 
we see very concretely the production of ‘freed slaves’ as legal persons without 
race, history, and social context; their humanity reduced to their legal status and 
detached from their community. Not a counter to the dehumanization of slave 
relations, juridical freedom carried its own oppressive pathologies and justifies 
its own unfreedoms, but this time internal to the notion of the human.68 
ICL historians and ICC advocates situate law as the great emancipator and, 
concomitantly, lament lack of access to law as the source of abjection. Yet the 
work of law may be more complex—foregrounding race here, backgrounding it 
there, predicating jurisdiction and standing on racial classification in one arena, 
and travelling as race-neutral in another. Once a captured ship travels through 
the adjudicatory process, race gets constituted as background fact rather than the 
product of legal processes; repressed and buried to present itself only as that 
which is overcome through judicial recognition of an African’s humanity. The 
rule of law is invested with the authority that attaches to a standard-bearer of this 
idealized notion of a pure redemptive humanity. Moreover, legal recognition of 
a captured man or woman as ‘human’ yields the affirmation of white normativity 
in the very heart of what it means to be human. Arguably, this legal recognition 
dependent precarity is part of the memory of racial difference that shapes 
personhood in front of ICL today where having your case heard in court is often 
framed as validating your victimhood, and by extension your personhood. The 
maldistribution of the profits of ICL legitimacy can be tracked along W.E.B. Du 
Bois’s reflections, a century after the abolition of the trade in England and 
America, on the ‘outlook for the darker races of mankind’ as he predicts the 
persistence of ‘the color line’.69  Or to put it in a more contemporary vernacular, 
the colorline blind erasure of racial world orderings from this story of ‘crimes 
against humanity’ marks the line of white privilege as the historic origins of 
ICL.70 
For ICL historians like Martinez, the work of the Mixed Commission in 
Freetown and elsewhere is an antidote to the morass of disillusionment that 
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attends the work of international courts in the Hague today. It advances a 
redemptive story about the potential of international law and liberal humanism 
by going back to the tribunals to redeem the promise of international courts as a 
platform for morality marrying power. In reading race and its erasure into that 
story, we get a different narrative about how Euro-America empowered itself for 
and through imperial conquest in the wake of the slave trade, and this 
empowerment worked partly by constructing a category of ‘whiteness’, and by 
mirrored necessity, a racial other. Yet it is not a whiteness that heralds its own 
presence. Rather it is a whiteness that presents as nothing less than the new world 
order; here latent in the cosmopolitan institutionalism that seeks to knit together 
humanitarian aims with international adjudication. The Mixed Commission 
treaties linking and separating England from America, America from France, 
France from Spain, Spain from Portugal, Portugal from the Netherlands, and so 
on, were building blocks in the discursive production of whiteness, an imperial 
whiteness. When Du Bois invokes the ‘color line’, he is not speaking of melanin 
and naturalized racial categories, but the line that traverses land and ocean to 
trace the routes of colonialism and the slave trade to occupy the systemic 
inequalities and hierarchies of world order. Indeed, on this view, the color line 
stretches both before and beyond the twentieth century that Du Bois references, 
as the common thread of liberal universalism, from the rights revolution of the 
seventeenth century to the operation of international institutions in the twenty-
first century. Race and racial difference are of course fundamentally historical 
constructions that mean different things in different social, political, and 
historical contexts; thus, the work of racial difference in the Atlantic then, and 
in the Hague today, is profoundly different even when connected. However, 
foregrounding racial capitalism (in both its material and ideational dimensions) 
opens a window into the work of the colorblind law of the “human” in holding 
the color line and putting wind in the sails of a racially mal-distributive regime 
of global governance. 
We have discussed how ICL histories celebrating the abolition of the slave 
trade can operate as decoy distracting us from the ways in which slavery was 
legal and even sustained by the abolition. Humanitarian discourse can also do 
work that warrants unpacking when inflecting abolition discourse, often 
empowering not the agency of the enslaved but the agency of the rescuer. The 
moral economies of rescue were pivotal in the legitimacy of the Mixed 
Commissions and the financial and institutional support that they could 
command from their sponsoring states, particularly Great Britain. Thus, many 
abolitionists were keen to distinguish their human rights campaign from slave 
led freedom struggles that challenged the rule of law, such as Nat Turner’s 
rebellion or the underground railroad that pre-empted rescue with rebellion, and 
challenged the rule of law as part of the problem not the solution. For instance, 
the Haitian revolution was something of an embarrassment for the abolition 
movement because it conveyed militancy for the overthrow of slavery that was 
not dependent on developing the moral sympathy of the British and American 
public. The abolitionist paper The Anti-Slavery Record seeks to “soften the 
memory of the Haitian Revolution” through alternative narratives such as a story 
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saved his master’s family from retribution.”71 The humanity of the slave had to 
be proved in this two-step dance rejecting slave agency in the struggle for 
freedom, while making themselves sympathetic characters inviting rescue. 
Equally, for the moral compass of rescue to point to international law as the true 
north, the politics of resistance and abolition had to be depoliticized, moralized 
and reframed through dynamics that anticipated the victim-savior-savage triad 
that Makau Mutua describes as the coordinates of the contemporary human 
rights movement.72 The law of salvage refers, in international maritime law, to 
the material rewards that could be claimed by rescuing an imperiled ship, here 
prize law attached to the mixed commissions set up a parallel moral salvage that 
could be claimed by rescuing an enslaved African.73  
The regime of the ‘crimes against humanity’ that is instantiated in the mixed 
commissions is a splitting of the human between those who have a surfeit of 
rights, and those who need their rights bestowed from afar. Borrowing from 
Jacques Ranciere one can say that the rights the abolitionists were keen to grant 
the captured Africans were “the rights of those who were unable to enact any 
rights or even any claim in their name”.74 When discussing juridification, we 
discussed a process for sublimating race-talk into law-talk to produce the 
abstract legal human subject of ICL; with moralization, the premise of moral 
visibility as human is not the re-channeling of racial categories into juridical 
categories, but the overcoming of race and racial identity. One is human despite 
being black—recall Toussaint’s interrogation of the human “we are black, it is 
true, but..”. With whiteness as the default content of humanity, the moral 
framing had to be one that reinforced that racial normativity. This was both a 
process of framing the enslaved as making a plea for recognition that they were 
just like whites and embedding it in campaigns empowering whites to grant that 
recognition. It was the imperial benefit of the rights revolutions: “you do the 
same as charitable persons do with their old clothes. You give them to the poor. 
Those rights that appear to be useless in their place are sent abroad, along with 
medicine and clothes, to people deprived of medicine, clothes, and rights.”75 
 
The Anti-Slavery Committee chose a seal for its campaign that was 
designed to underscore that this was a campaign of rescue and beneficence. The 
seal had an image of a kneeling slave (designed by the pottery magnate Josiah 
Wedgewood) with an emotive caption “Am I Not a Man and a Brother”; this 
image and caption became the de facto logo and slogan of the abolitionists.76 
The seal invoked the voice of the enslaved man, but it was used by white British 
abolitionists on medallions that were pinned onto garments, embossed into 
platters the abolitionists displayed in their homes, and so on. Not unlike the 
Kony2012 bracelets and the “Save Darfur” pins, the material culture of 
eighteenth century humanitarianism underscores that was a project where ICL 
“recognition” was in fact rescue. The kneeling slave in the image was designed 
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with physical features intended to leave the abolitionist in no doubt about the 
intended racial references. Even more acutely, however, his supplicant posture 
and abject plea cemented racial definition: it was part of the racial ordering of 
humanitarian sentiment that black people prayed to white people for recognition, 
a prayer that overlooked race in extending recognition, human to human. To 
sport that, the Wedgewood medallion was to display human solidarity, 
inscribing difference as internal to humanitarianism such that one human granted 
recognition while the other human pleaded for recognition. The human was 
internally split, carrying with it these contradictions and hierarchies, and 
generosity and exploitation.  
      
 
CONCLUSION 
In our discussion of redemptive histories of international law, we have 
sought to provide alternative readings of both Nuremberg and Freetown by 
resituating the political stakes of celebrated incidents of legal virtue. This 
reframing has entailed connecting the dots between law and political economy, 
between regulation of ships on the Atlantic and the profit circuits of the 
plantation economy, and between Nuremberg and the International Monetary 
Fund. Most significantly, this reframing of international legal legacies entailed 
revisiting the history of international criminal tribunals in an effort to 
parochialize the invocation of “the interests of humanity.”77 For instance, the 
mandate and role of the Mixed Commissions is the establishment of the rule of 
humanity through canonical legal terms in the global racial ordering of the day, 
treaty, jurisdiction, prize law, property, and persons. In this framework, the 
extension of the human category to the illegally enslaved is a gesture of humane 
and humanitarian recognition. Slave traders were violating the law that indicated 
the illegality of the trade, but the abolition was itself an embryonic articulation 
of the notion that the victims of these crimes were not just the enslaved, but 
humanity as such. Indeed, to describe the victims as the enslaved is to understate 
the crime; it is the formulation of the slave trade as a “crime against humanity” 
that elevates it to one that violates the very value of humanness.  
The multi-pronged de-racialization of “crimes against humanity” in ICL’s 
backstory haunts the notion of the human and the entanglements of the human’s 
dual record of extraordinary humane solidarities and extraordinary inhumane 
actions. The work of the category “crimes against humanity” is to steer our gaze 
away from those entanglements to instead focus on juridically recognized 
perpetrators and the drama of the slave traders as moral and legal outliers. The 
slave trader emerges as that exceptional perpetrator whose most remarkable and 
enabling characteristic is not his location in the racialized logics of profit and 
property that sustain the majority of humanity’s profiteers, but his moral 
pathology. This denial of “the entanglements of slavery and freedom”78 
empowers liberal juridification as a central mechanism forging the expulsion of 
race and racial consciousness from the heritage of the “human.” Indeed, racial 
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consciousness is equated with the illiberal and inhumane profiting from racial 
distinction; then the slave trader, in contemporary ICL, is the perpetrator of 
genocide and a war criminal. Constituting and legitimizing the juridical 
authority and moral compass of international law has entailed the racial 
cleansing of that heritage of the human as race neutral rule of law; a project that, 
therefore, remains forever entangled with law defining and prosecuting the 
inhuman. As Walter Johnson has argued, there is “ideological work 
accomplished by holding on to a normative notion of ‘humanity’—one that can 
be held separate from the ‘inhuman’ actions of so many humans.”79 In 
understanding the imbrication of the field of ICL history in that ideological 
work, we need to confront the challenge that the most shocking fact about the 
international slave trade was not a rare inhuman monstrosity, but a banal human 
ordinariness.80 Sanitizing the notion of the human may be a project of masking 
its internal inhumanities and its record of complicities, individual and collective, 
ideational and structural. Johnson further notes that in refusing to confront the 
dark side of human virtue, “We are separating a normative and aspirational 
notion of humanity from the sorts of exploitation and violence that history 
suggests may well be definitive of human beings: we are separating ourselves 
from our own histories of perpetration.” The “human” sheds the weight of racial 
baggage—what Alexander Wheliya describes as “excess”—to emerge as a 
svelte, universally inclusive figure that does not implicate the structures and 
beneficiaries of racial capitalism.81 Indeed, it renders the “rescuer” too a victim, 
part of the anonymous mass of humanity wronged by the crime against humanity 
that is the slave trade. Thus, the narrowing of the designated perpetrator works 
alongside the broadening of the designated victim to an all-encompassing 
humanity, not just black humanity. A “crime against humanity” renders the 
victim abstract, deracialized, universal; today we might say it is a category that 
stands for the rallying cry that “All Lives Matter.”82  
To sum up, when confronted with a crisis of legitimacy, scholars of 
international law and international relations have been tempted to return to a 
redemptive history of international law and institutions as a guide and 
inspirations to safer waters. Instead, we may want to consider the legitimacy 
crisis as a prod to interrogate international legal history for its canonical biases, 
particularly with attention to the legacies of slavery, colonialism, and 
neocolonialism that are intertwined with international legal history. Thus, 
history remains pivotal today with authoritarianism getting new lease of life in 
a range of countries around the globe. However, with the emergence of 
authoritarian and fascist forces in earlier moments, we may need in fact to make 
different connections between then and now, and between what happens in the 
global South and what happens in the global North. Emerging from battles over 
fascism and decolonizing, Aimé Césaire, the Martinique poet of negritude, 
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described the boomerang effect between one and another, and his advice about 
how to connect those dots remains ever relevant. Thus, I want to conclude by 
considering one of the most poetic passages of Césaire’s Discourse on 
Colonialism, both mournful and sharply denunciatory, but full of wisdom for 
making connections across time and place that disrupt rather than redeem 
international law.  “We must study,” Césaire says, “We must study how 
colonization works to decivilize the colonizer, to brutalize him in the true sense 
of the word, to degrade him, to awaken him to buried instincts, to covetousness, 
violence, race hatred, and moral relativism.” “We must show,” Césaire says that  
we must show that each time a head is cut off or an eye put out in Vietnam 
and in France[,] they accept the fact[;] each time a little girl is raped and in 
France they accept the fact, each time a Madagascan is tortured and in France 
they accept the fact, civilization acquires another dead weight, a universal 
regression takes place, a gangrene sets in, a cancer of infection begins to spread, 
and that at the end of all these treaties that have been violated, all these lies that 
have been propagated, all these punitive expeditions that have been tolerated, all 
these patriots who have been tortured, at the end of all the racial pride that has 
been encouraged, all the boastfulness that has been displayed, a poison has been 
distilled into the veins of Europe and, slowly but surely, the continent proceeds 
towards savagery . . . And then one fine day the bourgeoisie is awakened by a 
terrific boomerang effect: the gestapos are busy, the prisons fill up, the torturers 
standing around the racks invent, refine, discuss . . . 83 
The crisis of authoritarianism that we are confronting in many parts of the 
world today in the 21st century was foretold by “the mad and melancholy record” 
of crises of centuries past in Vietnam and Madagascar, Hiroshima and the Black 
Atlantic. In writing redemptive histories of international law as a salutary 
response to crisis, we ignore international law’s own imbrication with these 
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